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Revisiting the Fraud Exception: A Critique of United City Merchants v 
Royal Bank of Canada forty years on 
Dr Katie Richards* 
 
Forty years have passed since Lord Diplock’s seminal judgment in United City Merchants v 
Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord)1 which established the fraud exception in 
transactions financed by documentary credit. Fraud is a significant risk in credit transactions; 
the system is reliant on documents which can be easily forged,2 goods are frequently shipped 
in containers3 between parties unknown to each other and separated by geographical, 
cultural and legal distance.4 Consequently, it is almost inconceivable that fraud does not 
happen in these transactions, particularly given the volume of global trade the device 
supports.5 And yet, the fraud exception has never been successfully invoked to prevent 
payment. This is attributed to both the narrow confines of the fraud exception, as constructed 
by Lord Diplock, and the fact that fraud must be proved within a short timeframe for the 
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1 United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [ϭϵϴϮ] Ϯ LloǇd’s ‘ep. ϭ ;heƌeafteƌ United 
City Merchants (HL). 
2 EP ElliŶgeƌ, ͚Fƌaud iŶ doĐuŵeŶtaƌǇ Đƌedit tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs’ [ϭϵϴϭ] JBL Ϯϱϴ, Ϯϱϴ; P Todd, Maritime Fraud & Piracy 
(2nd ed. Informa, 2010), [3.022]. 
3 Todd, Maritime Fraud & Piracy (n2) [4-058]. 
4 Ibid [4.003]. 
5 United Nations Conference on Trade And Development, ͚DoĐuŵeŶtaƌǇ ƌisk iŶ ĐoŵŵoditǇ tƌade’ ;ϭϵϵϴͿ, ϭ: 
letters of credit supported trade worth US$100 billion/year and accounted for 60% of commodity sales; H Beale 
(ed.) Chitty on Contracts (32nd ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 2015), [34-ϰϰϲ]; J Moƌa aŶd W Poǁeƌs, ͚Gloďal peƌspeĐtiǀes 
iŶ the deĐliŶe of tƌade fiŶaŶĐe’ iŶ JP Chauffouƌ aŶd M MalouĐhe ;eds.Ϳ, Trade Finance during the Great Trade 
Collapse (The World Bank, 2011) 128. 
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exception to operate. This non-use of the fraud exception should not be confused with an 
argument that fraud is rife in transactions financed by documentary credit. It may well be 
that, in practice, fraud is constrained in other ways, such as by the doctrine of strict 
compliance6 or reputational forces that serve to reduce wrongdoing. However, an 
examination of the fraud rule is important – this is ostensibly the judicial response to 
wrongdoing by credit beneficiaries – and timely, given developments in credit law since the 
decision in United City Merchants. 
 
The judgment has divided the legal community over the last four decades. On the one hand, 
subsequent case law7 and several academic commentators8 haǀe eŶdoƌsed Loƌd DiploĐk’s 
approach while, on the other hand, the judgment has received stringent criticism from leading 
scholars, such as Roy Goode9 and Michael Bridge.10 This article joins the dissenters and argues 
that judicial, legislatiǀe aŶd aĐadeŵiĐ deǀelopŵeŶts siŶĐe Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgŵeŶt aŶd 
Goode’s ĐƌitiƋue justify a re-examination of the fraud exception and, in particular, a departure 
from United City Merchants. 
 
To make this argument, this article re-examines the facts and decision in United City 
Merchants in Part 1.11 It demonstrates the importance that policy considerations – most 
notably, the efficiency of the credit mechanism – plaǇed iŶ Loƌd DiploĐk’s deĐisioŶ to ĐoŶfiŶe 
                                                     
6 D Horowitz, Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees: Defences to Payment (OUP, 2010), [3.19]; Ellinger (n2) 
260. 
7 Montrod Ltd v Grundkötter Fleischvertreibs GmbH [2002] 1 WLR 1975. 
8 A Malek and D Quest, Jack: Documentary Credits (4th ed. Tottel Publishing, 2009), [9.15] et seq. 
9 ‘ Goode, ͚AďstƌaĐt paǇŵeŶt uŶdeƌtakiŶgs’ iŶ P CaŶe aŶd J StapletoŶ ;eds.Ϳ, Essays for Patrick Atiyah (Clarendon 
Press, 1991). 
10 M Bƌidge, ͚DoĐuŵeŶts aŶd ĐoŶtƌaĐtual ĐoŶgƌueŶĐe iŶ iŶteƌŶatioŶal tƌade’ iŶ S Worthington, (ed.), Commercial 
Law and Commercial Practice (Hart, 2003). 
11 United City Merchants (HL) (n1). 
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the fraud exception within narrow parameters. This provides a useful foundation to consider 
two distinct, although often conflated, areas of debate ǁhiĐh floǁ fƌoŵ Loƌd DiploĐk’s 
analysis. Firstly, the narrow parameters of the fraud exception has prompted much discussion 
about whether it should be widened to encompass a broader range of wrongdoing by the 
credit beneficiary. A comparative approach, drawing on the American response to fraud in 
credit transactions, is used in Part 2 to reflect on English insistence that a narrow fraud rule 
is justified by commercial need. It argues that the broader exception employed in the United 
States has Ŷot ƌesulted iŶ the ͚thƌoŵďosis’12 so feared by English courts and, moreover, that 
recent American commentary endorses their current position. This provides scope for a 
modern court to reconsider the policies underpinning the rule and consign United City 
Merchants to history.  
 
The second area of debate focusses on the doctrine of strict compliance. This is because Lord 
Diplock failed to give due weight to this doctrine in his analysis of the credit mechanism. 
Indeed, he characterised the bank as being under a contractual obligation to make payment 
against documents which were known to be forged at the time of presentation.13 This 
conflation was noted by Goode14 shortly after the judgment in United City Merchants and his 
analysis is necessarily central to any critique of Loƌd DiploĐk’s appƌoaĐh. Hoǁeǀeƌ, this aƌtiĐle 
argues that recent developments – including the UCP 600 and case law on null documents – 
further justifies a departure from the analysis in United City Merchants. Accordingly, in Part 4 
the article concludes by outlining an approach more faithful to both the UCP 600 and the 
                                                     
12 Intraco Ltd v Notis Shipping Corporation of Liberia (The Bhoja Trader) [ϭϵϴϭ] Ϯ LloǇd’s ‘ep. Ϯϱϲ, Ϯϱϳ peƌ 
Donaldson LJ. 
13 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7 per Lord Diplock. 
14 Goode (n9). 
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needs of modern commercial parties when documents are proven nullities or forgeries at the 
time of presentation.  
 
 
1. United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada15 
A transaction financed by documentary credit is, at its heart, a simple transaction for the sale 
of goods. This is complicated, however, by the international context in which the transaction 
occurs. The great distances separating parties means that in the majority of cases shipment 
and payment are not simultaneous.16 Sequential contractual performance creates risks for 
both parties, as Thomas Hobbes argued in Leviathan: 
 
for he that performeth first, has no assurance the other will perform after, because 
the bonds of words are too weak to bridle men's ambition, avarice, anger, and other 
passioŶs, ǁithout the feaƌ of soŵe ĐoeƌĐiǀe poǁeƌ…17 
 
These risks are exacerbated in credit transactions when, as will often be the case, the parties 
aƌe uŶkŶoǁŶ to eaĐh otheƌ. Fƌoŵ the selleƌ’s peƌspeĐtiǀe, the ƌisk assoĐiated ǁith shippiŶg 
the goods in advance is that it creates an incentive for the buyer to identify a trivial defect in 
the goods to withhold payment.18 Conversely, the buyer will not want to pay in advance since 
                                                     
15 United City Merchants (HL) (n1). 
16 G GuŶdlaĐh, ͚EǆĐhaŶge goǀeƌŶaŶĐe: The ƌole of legal aŶd ŶoŶlegal appƌoaĐhes aĐƌoss the eǆĐhaŶge pƌoĐess’ 
(1994) 13(2) J Pub Pol & Mark. 246, 247; R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (5th ed. Aspen Publishers, 1998), 
101. 
17 T Hobbes, Leviathan (first published 1651, Blackwell 1955), 89-90.   
18 ‘ MaŶŶ, ͚The ƌole of letteƌs of Đƌedit iŶ paǇŵeŶt tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs’ (1999-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2494, 2517; AW 
Katz, ͚IŶfoƌŵalitǇ as a ďilateƌal assuƌaŶĐe ŵeĐhaŶisŵ. CoŵŵeŶts oŶ ‘oŶald MaŶŶ’s ͚The ƌole of letteƌs of Đƌedit 
iŶ paǇŵeŶt tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs’ ;ϭϵϵϵ-2000) 98 Mich L Rev 2554, 2556. 
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he cannot ascertain the quality of the goods.19 If cross-border transactions are going to 
succeed, therefore, parties must incorporate a mechanism to mitigate these risks and render 
performance as simultaneous as possible. 
 
To illustrate how the documentary credit serves this purpose and to reacquaint readers with 
the principles underpinning the mechanism, it is convenient to begin with the facts of United 
City Merchants.20 The case is a paradigmatic example of the circumstances in which we would 
expect a credit to be used; an English seller contracting to supply a fibre glass plant to 
Peruvian buyers. Cognisant of the risks inherent in the transaction, the parties financed their 
transaction by documentary credit and incorporated the Uniform Customs & Practice for 
Documentary Credits (UCP), a ǀoluŶtaƌǇ set of ͚ďest pƌaĐtiĐe’ rules for credit transactions 
produced by the International Chamber of Commerce.21 The UCP is adopted in almost all 
credit transactions22 and has become the ͚ŵost suĐĐessful set of private rules for trade ever 
deǀeloped.’23 
 
Put simply, the credit transforms the sale into one conducted through the medium of 
documents and introduces banks to the contractual network. This creates a channel through 
which payment is made to the seller and the documents are passed to the buyer. The resulting 
network of contracts, and the stages of the transaction, are illustrated below: 
                                                     
19 Mann (n18) 2516-2517; Katz (n18) 2556. 
20 United City Merchants (HL) (n1). 
21 The paƌties’ ĐoŶtƌaĐt ǁas goǀeƌŶed ďǇ IŶteƌŶatioŶal Chaŵďeƌ of CoŵŵeƌĐe, ͚The Uniform Customs and 
Practice for Documentary Credits’ ;ϭϵϳϰ Revision, ICC Publication no. 300), The current version is the UCP 600: 
IŶteƌŶatioŶal Chaŵďeƌ of CoŵŵeƌĐe, ͚The Uniform Customs and Practice for Documentary Credits’ ;2007 
Revision, ICC Publication no. 600) (hereafter UCP 600). 
22 UCP 600, foreword. 
23 UCP 600, foreword. 
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These contracts are subject to the twin principles of autonomy and strict compliance. The 
doctrine of autonomy requires each contract to be seen in isolation from all other contracts 
in the network meaning that it is enforced by reference to its own terms. This renders the 
transaction less susceptible to judicial intervention since neither the paying bank nor the 
credit applicant will be able to raise issues elsewhere in the credit network, most notably a 
breach of the underlying contract, to prevent payment under the instant contract.24 In United 
City Merchants, Lord Diplock referred to autonomy in the following terms: 
 
 
The whole commercial purpose for which the system of confirmed irrevocable 
documentary credits has been developed in international trade is to give to the seller 
                                                     
24 Todd, Maritime Fraud (n2) [4-021].  
BUYER/APPLICANT (B) SELLER/BENEFICIARY (S)
ISSUING BANK (IB) CONFIRMING BANK (CB)
1. B and S agree to finance
contract by letter of credit.
2. B asks IB to open credit in S’s favour
3. IB opens credit in S’s favour.
4. CB informs S that credit open.
5. S ships goods and presents
shipping documents to CB.
6. Provided documents conform 
to terms of the credit, CB pays S.
7. CB presents documents to IB.
8. Provided documents conform,
IB reimburses CB.
9. IB presents documents to B
10. IB debits B’s account
 7 
an assured right to be paid before he parts with control of the goods that does not 
permit of any dispute with the buyer as to the performance of the contract of sale 
being used as a ground for non-payment or reduction or deferment of payment.25  
 
The second principle – the doctrine of strict compliance – dictates the standard against which 
presented documents are assessed. When the beneficiary presents documents – typically a 
clean bill of lading, insurance policy and a quality certificate issued by a third party26 - which 
strictly conform to what has been agreed in the underlying contract, payment will be made. 
The quality of the presentation is clearly vital in a sale conducted through the medium of 
documents. This was made plain by Viscount Cave in Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson 
Partners: 
 
there is no room for documents which are almost the same, or which will do just as 
well. Business could not proceed securely on any other lines.27 
Simply, commercial parties must be able to trust that the documents are genuine and 
represent the goods in question. This is particularly critical given that the goods will either 
arrive much later than the documents or may never reach the intermediate buyer when the 
goods are sold afloat. Genuine documentation has a further significance in credit 
transactions, as noted by Lord Diplock,28 because of the risk that the credit applicant may 
become insolvent before he has reimbursed the issuing bank. In a standard contract of sale, 
the risk of buyer insolvency falls on the seller but in a documentary credit transaction, this 
                                                     
25 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 6 per Lord Diplock. 
26 Chitty (n5) [34-447]. 
27 Equitable Trust Co of New York v Dawson Partners Ltd (1926) 27 Ll L Rep 49, 52 per Viscount Cave. 
28 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 6 per Lord Diplock. 
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risk is transferred to the issuing bank. The bank is willing to accept this risk since it has prior 
kŶoǁledge of the appliĐaŶt’s ĐƌeditǁoƌthiŶess aŶd ĐaŶ pƌiĐe the Đƌedit ĐoŵŵeŶsuƌate to the 
level of risk the customer represents.29 In addition, as the bank retains the shipping 
documents until it has been reimbursed by the applicant, the documents represent security 
and ĐaŶ ďe sold to a thiƌd paƌtǇ iŶ the eǀeŶt of the appliĐaŶt’s insolvency.30 That the insolvency 
risk is the major concern for the banks was underlined in the celebrated discussion31 in 
Sanders v Maclean.32 In that case, Bowen LJ stated that ͚the object of mercantile usages is to 
prevent the risk of insolvency, not of fraud’33 and, moreover, that this foundation was critical 
to understanding ͚the law merchant.’ 34 Accordingly, fƌoŵ the ďaŶks’ peƌspeĐtiǀe, for the 
credit to effectively mitigate the risk of applicant insolvency, it is vital that the documents are 
what they appear to be. 
 
Lord Diplock referred to ͚stipulated doĐuŵeŶts’35 throughout his judgment and, at first, 
ĐoƌƌeĐtlǇ ĐhaƌaĐteƌised the paǇiŶg ďaŶk’s oďligatioŶ iŶ the folloǁiŶg teƌŵs: 
  
                                                     
29 GL Sŵith, ͚IƌƌeǀoĐaďle letteƌs of Đƌedit aŶd thiƌd paƌtǇ fƌaud: The American Accord’ ;ϭϵϴϯ-1984) 24 Va J Intl L 
55, 94-95: ͚The reply was unanimous: the credit-worthiness of the customer is the overriding and sometimes 
exclusive basis on which banks issue letters of credit. Expenses incurred in resale and the usually dramatic 
discount at which goods are resold in order to realize security makes the value of the goods as represented by 
the documents of almost academic significance in practice.’; K DoŶŶellǇ, ͚ NothiŶg foƌ ŶothiŶg: A ŶullitǇ eǆĐeptioŶ 
iŶ letteƌs of Đƌedit’ [ϮϬϬϴ] JBL ϯϭϲ, ϯϱϳ; Mann (n18) 2529. 
30 Recognised in Beam Technology (MfG) Pte Ltd v Standard Chartered Bank [2002] SGCA 53, [33]; F Lorenzon, 
͚IŶteƌŶatioŶal tƌade aŶd shippiŶg doĐuŵeŶts’ iŶ Y Baatz ;ed.Ϳ, Maritime Law (4th ed. Informa, 2017), 116. 
31 The Future Express [ϭϵϵϯ] Ϯ LloǇd’s ‘ep. ϱϰϮ, ϱϰϰ. 
32 Sanders v Maclean (1883) 11 QBD 327. 
33 Ibid 343 per Bowen LJ. 
34 Ibid 343 per Bowen LJ. 
35 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 6 per Lord Diplock. 
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If, on their face, the documents presented to the confirming bank by the seller 
conform with the requirements of the credit as notified to him by the confirming bank, 
that bank is under a contractual obligation to the seller to honour the credit,36  
 
The ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚oŶ theiƌ faĐe’ iŶ this paƌt of the aŶalǇsis ŵeƌits ĐoŶsideƌatioŶ. The ďaŶk’s 
role is simply to examine the documents for compliance with the terms and conditions of the 
credit. Banks are not investigators and do not assume any liability for the genuineness or 
accuracy of the documents,37 beyond the fact that they appear to be what the credit demands. 
Couching the ďaŶk’s ƌole iŶ adŵiŶistƌatiǀe teƌŵs ensures that payments are made swiftly and 
is said to reflect the fact that banks cannot be expected to be experts in all transaction they 
agree to finance.38 Prompt payment is necessarily beneficial for the seller but it also enables 
the buyer to take actions in respect of the goods, including selling them afloat, as soon as he 
receives the documents. Critically, ahead of the analysis in Part 3, the ͚oŶ theiƌ faĐe’ appƌoaĐh 
to compliance contained in the UCP did not oblige the bank to pay if it actually knew that the 
documents were not what they appeared to be. It ŵeƌelǇ speĐified that the ďaŶk’s 
examination was confined to the documents alone.39 
 
The network of contracts created by the credit redistributes many of the risks inherent in an 
international contract of sale. As the diagram above shows, instead of the buyer paying the 
seller directly, the seller receives payment from the confirming bank – a bank located in his 
own country – which is then reimbursed by the issuing bank. As noted above, this shifts the 
                                                     
36 Ibid 6 per Lord Diplock. 
37 UCP 600 Art.34. 
38 Equitable Trust (n27) 52 per Viscount Cave; P Todd, Bills of Lading and Bankers Documentary Credits (4th ed. 
Informa, 2007), [9.6]. 
39 J Ulph, ͚The UCP ϲϬϬ: DoĐuŵeŶtaƌǇ Đƌedits iŶ the Ϯϭst ĐeŶtuƌǇ’ [ϮϬϬϳ] JBL ϯϱϱ, ϯϲϮ. 
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risk of buyer insolvency from the seller-beneficiary to the issuing bank.40 In addition, 
conditioning payment on the presentation of complying documents protects both buyer and 
seller from the risk of theiƌ ĐouŶteƌpaƌt’s opportunistic behaviour due to the sequential 
nature of contractual performance. Fƌoŵ the ďuǇeƌ’s peƌspeĐtiǀe, the iŶĐlusioŶ of a ƋualitǇ 
certificate issued by an independent party provides reassurance that the contract goods have 
been shipped,41 while for the seller, strict compliance prevents the buyer withholding 
payment on the basis of a trivial defect in the goods. 
 
To return to the facts of United City Merchants, the credit required that the vessel departed 
Felixstowe, England by 15/12/1976 and the seller-beneficiary presented documents 
appearing to show that this had taken place. In reality, however, the goods were shipped two 
daǇs’ late and from a different port. A third-party loading broker had falsified the bill of lading 
to give the impression of compliance with the credit.42 Before the documents were presented 
for examination, the shipping line had informed the buyer of the late shipment. The issuing 
bank had also been notified at this time.43 When the confirming bank was made aware of this, 
it refused to pay due to the fraudulent nature of the documents. The beneficiary then brought 
an action for wrongful dishonour of the credit.  
 
The question for the House of Lords was whether fraud perpetrated by a third party could be 
used to justify non-payment by the bank. Put another way, in what circumstances would the 
                                                     
40 M Bridge, Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (10th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 2017), [23-077]. 
41 Mann (n18) 2505; M Moses, ͚Letteƌs of Đƌedit aŶd the iŶsolǀeŶt appliĐaŶt: A ƌeĐipe foƌ ďad faith dishoŶoƌ’ 
(2005-2006) 57 Ala L Rev 31, 47. 
42 United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [ϭϵϳϵ] ϭ LloǇd’s ‘ep. Ϯϲϳ, Ϯϳϴ peƌ 
Mocatta J (hereafter United City Merchants (FI)), 273 per Mocatta J. 
43 Ibid. 
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court recognise an exception to the autonomy of the credit and permit evidence extraneous 
to the goods to substantiate a fraud? In a unanimous judgment delivered by Lord Diplock, the 
Court answered the first question in the negative. Payment could only be legitimately refused: 
 
where the seller, for the purpose of drawing on the credit, fraudulently presents to 
the confirming bank documents that contain, expressly or by implication, material 
representations of fact that to his knowledge are untrue.44 
 
The ƌule ǁas eǆplaiŶed as ͚a clear application of the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio or, 
if plaiŶ EŶglish is to ďe pƌefeƌƌed, fƌaud uŶƌaǀels all.’45 This directs the court to focus its 
attention on the beneficiary to determine whether he has engaged in any wrongdoing in 
relation to the documents. In such circumstances where, for example, the beneficiary had 
deliberately falsified the documents or presented documents without having shipped the 
contract goods, the court will accept evidence extraneous to the documents to substantiate 
the ďeŶefiĐiaƌǇ’s ǁƌoŶgdoiŶg. This ŵaǇ iŶǀolǀe diƌeĐt eǀidence from a third party, 
documentary evidence relating to the underlying contract or a sample of the contractual 
goods.46 However, in United City Merchants, the fraud was perpetrated by a third party 
ǁithout the ďeŶefiĐiaƌǇ’s knowledge meaning that the fraud exception could not operate. 
 
There is no doubt that in constructing the fraud exception in this way, Lord Diplock was 
attempting to limit the scope of judicial intervention. To do otherwise, his Lordship argued,  
͚would…undermine the whole system of financing international trade by means of 
                                                     
44 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 6 per Lord Diplock. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Malek and Quest, Jack (n8) [9.2]. 
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doĐuŵeŶtaƌǇ Đƌedits.’47 In addition to the narrow parameters of the fraud exception, if it is to 
be employed to prevent payment reaching the beneficiary, evidence of fraud must gathered 
within the five banking days permitted for document examination. In addition to these time 
constraints, the standard of proof, as is common in allegations of fraud, is high. For several 
years, the courts struggled to explain exactly what was required in order to prove fraud. The 
case law, for example, contains references to proof of ͚established or obvious fraud,’48 a ͚real 
prospect’49 of establishing fraud and ͚a good arguable case that on the material available the 
only realistic inference’ is fraud.50 However expressed, there is a crucial balance to ensure 
that the courts do not: 
 
adopt so restrictive an approach to the evidence required as to prevent themselves 
from intervening. Were this to be the case, impressive and high-sounding phrases 
such as "fraud unravels all" would become meaningless.51 
 
The standard of proof was most recently considered in Alternative Power Supply v Central 
Electricity Board. In that case, the Privy Council reviewed the authorities and concluded: 
 
it must be clearly established at the interlocutory stage that the only realistic inference 
is (a) that the beneficiary could not honestly have believed in the validity of its 
demands under the letter of credit and (b) that the bank was aware of the fraud.52 
                                                     
47 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7 per Lord Diplock. 
48 Edward Owen Engineering v Barclays Bank International [1979] 1 QB 159, 169 per Denning LJ. 
49 Solo Industries v Canara Bank [ϮϬϬϭ] Ϯ LloǇd’s ‘ep. ϱϳϴ, [ϳϯ] per Mance LJ. 
50 United Trading Corporation v Allied Arab Bank Ltd [1985] 2 Lloyd's Rep 554, 561 per Ackner LJ. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Alternative Power Solution Ltd v Central Electricity Board [2014] UKPC 31, [59] per Lord Clarke.  
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This usefully clarifies the position but does not mitigate the practical difficulty of amassing 
sufficient evidence within five banking days.53 This must be borne in mind in any critique of 
the fraud rule. However, this article focuses on the two specific, although often conflated, 
areas of debate flowing from Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgment. Firstly, his decision to limit judicial 
intervention to preserve the efficiency of the credit mechanism has prompted consideration 
of the proper bounds of the fraud rule. In Part 2, the policy justification of the English rule will 
be challenged in light of the broader exception codified in the American Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC) and recent commentary suggesting that the American exception functions 
satisfactorily. 
 
Secondly, the focus on wrongdoing by the beneficiary means that defects in the documents 
perpetrated by a third party will not trigger the fraud exception. Specifically, documents 
which are known to be forged at the time of presentation but which appear to conform did 
Ŷot, oŶ Loƌd DiploĐk’s aŶalǇsis, justifǇ ŶoŶ-payment by the bank. This undermined the 
doctrine of strict compliance. Recent developments in documentary credit law, most notably 
the UCP 600 and judicial decisions on null documents, strengthen this analysis and are used, 
in Part 3, to argue in favour of a new approach when documents are proven forgeries or 
nullities at presentation. 
 
                                                     
53 Todd, Maritime Fraud ;ŶϮͿ [ϰ.ϬϬϴ]; G MĐMeel, ͚Letteƌs of Đƌedit aŶd the fƌaud eǆĐeptioŶ – the threshold test 
foƌ iŶjuŶĐtiǀe ƌelief’ [ϮϬϭϱ] LMCLQ ϭϵ, ϮϮ. 
 14 
2. The narrow confines of the English fraud exception  
The driving force behind the narrow parameters of the fraud exception was, as noted above, 
Loƌd DiploĐk’s desire to maintain the efficiency of the credit mechanism. This argument had 
been well-rehearsed in earlier case law, as demonstrated by DoŶaldsoŶ LJ’s discussion in The 
Bhoja Trader: 
 
thrombosis will occur if, unless fraud is involved, the Courts intervene and thereby 
disturb the mercantile practice of treating rights thereunder as being the equivalent 
of cash in hand54 
 
This is a laudable policy objective and, since the ICC has repeatedly maintained that fraud is 
best dealt with by national jurisdictions,55 was an entirely legitimate path for the House of 
Lords to take. It is interesting, however, to reflect on the narrowness of the exception in light 
of the more expansive approach taken in the United States. This comparison is triggered by 
Loƌd DiploĐk’s ĐoŵŵeŶts iŶ United City Merchants: 
 
…[the fƌaud eǆĐeptioŶ] is well established in the American cases of which the leading 
or "landmark" case is Sztejn v. J. Henry Schroeder Banking Corp…This judgment of the 
New York Court of Appeals was referred to with approval by the English Court of 
Appeal in Edward Owen Engineering Ltd. v. Barclays Bank International Ltd…56 
 
                                                     
54 The Bhoja Trader (n12) 257 per Donaldson LJ. 
55 ICC BaŶkiŶg CoŵŵissioŶ, ͚Latest Ƌueƌies aŶsǁeƌed ďǇ the ICC BaŶkiŶg CoŵŵissioŶ’ ;ϭϵϵϳͿ ϯ;ϮͿ DoĐuŵeŶtaƌǇ 
Cƌedits IŶsight ϲ iŶ A DaǀidsoŶ, ͚Fraud, the Prime Exception to the Autonomy PƌiŶĐiple iŶ Letteƌs of Cƌedit’ (2003) 
8 Intl. Trade & Bus L Ann 23, 26. 
56 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 6 per Lord Diplock. 
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In addition, Ackner LJ subsequently commented on the American approach in United Trading 
which speaks directly to English fears connected to a broader exception: 
 
It is interesting to observe that in America, where concern to avoid irreparable 
damage to international commerce is hardly likely to be lacking, interlocutory relief 
appears to be ŵoƌe easilǇ oďtaiŶaďle…Theƌe is Ŷo suggestioŶ that this ŵoƌe liďeƌal 
appƌoaĐh has ƌesulted iŶ…ĐoŵŵeƌĐial disloĐatioŶ…57 
 
In Sztejn the fraudulent seller had deliberately failed to ship any of the contract goods. This 
was analysed by Shientag J as fraud in the transaction58 but because the documents appeared 
to conform, the fraud was also documentary in nature, consisting of material 
misrepresentations in the bill of lading.59 This was subsequently codified in Article 5, UCC. 
Accordingly, unless the presentation was made by an innocent third party – a nominated bank 
or a person in the position of a holder in due course60 – the bank was entitled to reject:  
 
when documents appear on their face to comply with the terms of the credit but a 
ƌeƋuiƌed doĐuŵeŶt…is foƌged or fraudulent or there is fraud in the transaction61 
 
This is broader than the English exception. It recognises forgery as a basis for intervention and 
does not require that the beneficiary was the author nor aware of the defects. Applying this 
                                                     
57 United Trading (n51) 561. 
58 Sztejn v J Henry Schroder Banking Corp 177 Misc 719 (NY Misc 1941), 722 per Shientag J. 
59 United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada (The American Accord) [ϭϵϴϭ] ϭ LloǇd’s ‘ep. ϲϬϰ, ϲϮϴ peƌ 
Ackner LJ (hereafter United City Merchants (CA)), 627 per Ackner LJ. 
60 Uniform Commercial Code §5-114(1)(a) (1962); J Dolan, The Drafting History of UCC Article 5 (Carolina 
Academic Press, 2016) 153. 
61 UCC §5-114(1) (1962).  
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to United City Merchants, the bank would have been justified in rejecting the presentation; 
the bill of lading contained a false shipment date and the person seeking payment – the 
beneficiary – was not a protected party under the UCC. This was not the conclusion drawn by 
Lord Diplock. Instead, he argued that a beneficiary unaware of defects remained entitled to 
payment in America:  
 
This is certainly not so under the Uniform Commercial Code as against a person who 
has taken a draft drawn under the credit in circumstances that would make him a 
holder in due course, and I see no reason why, and there is nothing in the Uniform 
Commercial Code to suggest that, a seller/beneficiary who is ignorant of the forgery 
should be in any worse position because he has not negotiated the draft before 
presentation. 
 
But this, with respect, was incorrect. The UCC did not extend protection to the beneficiary in 
these circumstances and, moreover, to equate the beneficiary with the holder in due course 
is spurious. This is because, as Goode has argued, ͚the beneficiary under a credit is not like a 
holder in due course of a bill of exchange; he is only entitled to be paid if the documents are 
in order.’62 AĐĐoƌdiŶglǇ, a sigŶifiĐaŶt stƌaŶd of Loƌd DiploĐk’s aŶalǇsis ǁas depeŶdeŶt oŶ a 
flawed reading of US law. 
 
                                                     
62 United City Merchants (CA) (n60) 622-623 per Stephenson LJ. 
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Article 5 was revised in 1995. This recodification was designed to narrow the fraud exception 
and clarify the criteria for the grant of an injunction.63 As such, Article 5 now provides that 
unless payment is demanded by a protected party,64 the bank can reject a presentation which: 
 
appears on its face strictly to comply with the terms and conditions of the letter of 
credit, but a required document is forged or materially fraudulent, or honor of the 
presentation would facilitate a material fraud by the beneficiary on the issuer or 
applicant65 
 
Whilst noting the express purpose of the 1995 revisions, it remains the case that the American 
exception is broader and more likely to be invoked than its English counterpart. The opening 
sentence of Article 5 confirms that the court has jurisdiction in cases where the fraud appears 
on the face of the documents. Despite the apparent similarity with the English approach, 
Article 5 is substantially broader because it does not require that the fraud is connected to 
the beneficiary.66 Thus, where a document has been forged or is materially fraudulent, the 
court will focus on the character of the document rather than the identity of the wrongdoer.67 
This means that fraud by a third party unconnected to the beneficiary – as was the case in 
United City Merchants – remains actionable under the UCC since payment was not demanded 
by a protected party.68 
                                                     
63 Dolan, Drafting History (n61) 171. 
64 UCC §5-109(a)(1) 
65 UCC  §5-109(a)  
66 X Gao, ͚The identity of the fraudulent party under the fraud rule in letters of credit laǁ’ ;ϮϬϬϭͿ Ϯϰ;ϭͿ UNSW L 
Rev 119, 124. 
67 Ibid 124. 
68 See J Dolan, The Law of Letters of Credit Commercial and Standby Credits (4th ed. AS Pratt & Sons, 2007), [7-
85]. 
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Article 5 then clearly departs from the English approach by recognising that fraud in the 
transaction also triggers the exception. This is evident in the phrase ͚hoŶoƌ of the 
pƌeseŶtatioŶ ǁould faĐilitate a ŵateƌial fƌaud ďǇ the ďeŶefiĐiaƌǇ oŶ the issueƌ oƌ appliĐaŶt’. 
This permits the court to intervene in cases of fraudulent misrepresentation by the 
beneficiary which either induced the documentary credit itself69 or the underlying contract of 
sale.70 Significantly, judicial intervention in these circumstances requires that the wrongdoing 
is authored by the beneficiary. Irrespective of this limitation, the recognition of non-
documentary fraud establishes the breadth of the US position in comparison to its English 
equivalent.   
 
In both jurisdictions, actionable fraud is characterised as material but this standard has been 
defined differently. In line with the general trend of Article 5, the American courts have 
conceptualised material fraud more expansively than their English counterparts, Lord Diplock 
failed to define materiality in United City Merchants, although in rejecting two conceptions71 
did provide some guidance as to what would not be material. In English law, materiality has 
siŶĐe ďeeŶ ƌelated to the ďaŶk’s oďligatioŶ to paǇ so that if the shippiŶg doĐuŵeŶts stated 
the truth the bank would not be bound to pay since the documents would fail the compliance 
test.72 The American approach to materiality is more flexible, and therefore more generous,73 
                                                     
69 Eg Mid-America Tire Inc. v PTZ Trading 768 NE 2d 619 (Ohio 2002) cited in J Barnes and J BǇƌŶe, ͚Letteƌs of 
Đƌedit: ϮϬϬϮ Đases’ ;ϮϬ02-2003) 58 Bus. Law. 1605, 1608. 
70 NMC Enterprises Inc. v Columbia Broadcasting Sys Inc. 14 UCC Rep. Serv. 1427 (Sup. Ct. NY County 1974). 
71 N Enonchong, The Independence Principle of Letters of Credit and Demand Guarantees (OUP, 2011), [5.23]-
[5.25]; United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7-8 per Lord Diplock.  
72 Malek and Quest, Jack (n8) [9.17].  
73 C Destrée aŶd C SpaŶos, ͚SeŶsitiǀitǇ to fƌaud: DeŵaŶd guaƌaŶtees & staŶdďǇ letteƌs of Đƌedit’ ;MaƌĐh ϮϬϬϮͿ 
52(2) Keeping Good Companies 94, 97. 
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to the party seeking to invoke the fraud exception. In particular, materiality is judged by 
reference to the underlying contract and to the impact of fraud on the purchaser.74 This 
makes sense given that the American exception encompasses both documentary fraud and 
that related to the underlying contract. By way of illustration, a material fraud would have 
been committed where, in a contract for the sale of 1000 barrels of oil, the beneficiary 
presented apparently complying documentation but had only shipped five of the required 
barrels.75 A shipment of 998 barrels would be regarded as an ͚iŶsuďstaŶtial aŶd iŵŵateƌial’ 
breach of the underlying contract.76 Clearly, these examples drawn from the Official 
Comment to the 1995 Revisions represent the very extremes of partial shipment. There was 
no further discussion at the time nor subsequently as to where the tipping point should lie; 
exactly when does short shipment become fraud?77 Recently, Dolan has argued that 
ŵateƌialitǇ ǁill Ŷot ďe easǇ to satisfǇ siŶĐe the Đouƌts’ iŶteŶtioŶ, iŶ iŶteƌpƌetiŶg AƌtiĐle ϱ, is to 
narrow the fraud exception.78 It is likely, therefore, the courts will require a greater number 
of the barrels to be missing before short delivery is deemed fraudulent. It is also arguable that 
permitted tolerances in the UCP would influence the appropriate tipping point. In particular, 
article 30b permits a tolerance of +/- 5% in quantity unless the credit explicitly stipulates the 
͚Ŷuŵďeƌ of paĐkiŶg uŶits oƌ iŶdiǀidual iteŵs.’79 This is not directly applicable to the above 
example since 1000 barrels are expressly stipulated. However, a court may well be influenced 
by the 5% threshold in the UCP so that short delivery would only be regarded as fraud when 
                                                     
74 AŵeƌiĐaŶ Laǁ IŶstitute, ͚ [‘eǀised] AƌtiĐle ϱ. Letteƌs of Cƌedit. Official Comment’ aǀailaďle at: http://elearn.uni-
sofia.bg/pluginfile.php/91213/mod_resource/content/1/Revised_UCC_Article_5.pdf (accessed 14/09/2016) 
Comment on art 5-109 [1] as cited in X Gao, The Fraud Rule in the Law of Letters of Credit: A Comparative Survey 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002) 84. 
75 Ibid. 
76 Cited iŶ ‘ BuĐkleǇ aŶd X Gao, ͚A Đoŵpaƌatiǀe aŶalǇsis of the staŶdaƌd of fƌaud ƌeƋuiƌed uŶdeƌ the fƌaud ƌule 
iŶ letteƌs of Đƌedit laǁ’ ;ϮϬϬϯͿ ϭϯ Duke J Coŵp & IŶtl L Ϯϵϯ, ϯϭϳ. 
77 I am grateful to the anonymous reviewer who highlighted this point. 
78 Dolan, Drafting History (n61) 171. 
79 UCP 600 Art 30b 
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at least 50 barrels were missing. Irrespective of where the tipping point actually falls – and 
this will often necessitate a complex factual enquiry – the US conception of materiality gives 
the courts greater to scope to intervene than in England. 
 
DiǀeƌgeŶt ƌespoŶses to fƌaud iŶ Đƌedit tƌaŶsaĐtioŶs steŵ fƌoŵ the ICC’s ƌepeated ƌefusal to 
include fraud within the UCP. The comparative discussion undertaken is not a suggestion that 
the English courts should simply import the American exception. However, this evidence of a 
different approach to fraud alloǁs us to ƌefleĐt oŶ Loƌd DiploĐk’s steadfast iŶsistence that a 
narrow exception was required to maintain the efficiency of the documentary credit, and to 
ĐoŶsideƌ ǁhetheƌ ͚thƌoŵďosis’80 has occurred in the United States. Indeed, both the 
traditional credit mechanism and standby credits – to which Article 5 also applies81 have 
remained popular in the United States.82 Moreover, recent commentary in the United States 
suggests that the position with respect to fraud is settled; the courts faithfully apply the 
provisions of Article 5 and there is no clamour for reform.83 More generally, there is sufficient 
litigation on credit issues to warrant an annual survey in The Business Lawyer.84 Interestingly, 
the consequent delay in payment and potential for judicial intervention does not appear to 
have to have affected the credit market. This is fascinating in light of the English view that 
judicial intervention in credit transactions would destroy the very essence of a swift, 
autonomous payment mechanism.  
                                                     
80 The Bhoja Trader (n12) 257 per Donaldson LJ. 
81 Official Comment (n75) 1. 
82 Dolan, Drafting History (n61) xvii. 
83 J BaƌŶes aŶd J BǇƌŶe, ͚Letteƌs of Cƌedit; ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ϲϵ;ϰͿ Bus Laǁ ϭϮϬϭ, ϭϮϬϯ; J Barnes and J BǇƌŶe, ͚Letteƌs of 
Cƌedit; ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ϳϬ;ϰͿ Bus Laǁ ϭϮϭϵ, ϭϮϮϰ; J BaƌŶes aŶd J BǇƌŶe, ͚Letteƌs of Cƌedit; ;ϮϬϭϲͿ ϳϭ;ϰͿ Bus Laǁ ϭϮϵϵ, 
1302. 
84 First published as H BaileǇ, ͚CoŵŵeƌĐial papeƌ, ďaŶk deposits aŶd ĐolleĐtioŶs aŶd letteƌs of Đƌedit’ ;ϭϵϲϱͿ ϮϬ 
Bus Law 711. 
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The discussion in Part 4 will reflect on what the comparative discussion means for the future 
of the English fraud rule. Specifically, it will be argued that the narrow parameters established 
by Lord Diplock can no longer be justified in the interests of commercial need and demand 
reconsideration. Attention now turns to the second difficulty following Loƌd DiploĐk’s 
analysis; the fate of documents proven to be forged or null at the time of presentation. 
 
 
3. The conflation of fraud and documentary compliance 
Having determined that the fraud exception was not operative, Lord Diplock then proceeded 
to consider the impact of documents which appeared to be those demanded by the credit 
but were actually forged or null. This, as shall be seen in due course, had occupied significant 
tiŵe at the Couƌt of Appeal. Hoǁeǀeƌ, ďefoƌe the suďstaŶtiǀe aspeĐts of Loƌd DiploĐk’s 
judgment are considered, the concepts of forgery and nullity will be illustrated. The first, 
forgery, is a doĐuŵeŶt ǁhiĐh ͚tell[s] a lie aďout itself,’85 such as the date or place of shipment 
or the apparent good order of the goods on loading.86 Notwithstanding such lies, forged 
documents remain capable of serving their intended commercial purposes,87 as a receipt or 
evidence of the contract of carriage. By contrast, a nullity is devoid of legal value.88 This would 
be the case where clean shipping documents were presented in respect of a phantom 
shipment89 or signed by an individual without the authority to do so.90 Certain forgeries, for 
                                                     
85 United City Merchants (CA) (n60) 618 per Stephenson LJ, 628 per Ackner LJ. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Goode (n9) 231; Bridge (n10) 230. 
88 Montrod (n7) [ϰϯ] peƌ Potteƌ LJ: ͚ǁoƌthless iŶ the seŶse that it is Ŷot geŶuiŶe aŶd has Ŷo ĐoŵŵeƌĐial ǀalue, 
whether as security foƌ the goods oƌ otheƌǁise.’ 
89 P Todd, ͚NoŶ geŶuiŶe shippiŶg doĐuŵeŶts aŶd Ŷullities’ [ϮϬϬϴ] LMCLQ ϱϰϳ, ϱϲϮ.  
90 Montrod (n7) [56] per Potter LJ.  
 22 
example a bill of lading not issued by the purported issuer or a certificate of insurance 
tendered without a valid policy91 may also render the document a nullity. Nullities are 
particularly problematic since they cannot be used to obtain delivery or provide other security 
over the goods.92 This clearly impacts the ultimate purchaser of the goods but, more 
significantly, will also deprive the issuing bank of pƌoteĐtioŶ iŶ the eǀeŶt of its Đustoŵeƌ’s 
insolvency. 
 
So, how should banks respond to presentations which contain forged or null documents? Lord 
Diplock fiƌst appƌoaĐhed this issue ďǇ settiŶg out the ďaŶk’s ĐoŶtƌaĐtual oďligatioŶ, ŶaŵelǇ to 
pay against presentations which appeared to conform to the credit: 
 
…as between confirming bank and issuing bank and as between issuing bank and the 
buyer the contractual duty of each bank under a confirmed irrevocable credit is to 
examine with reasonable care all documents presented in order to ascertain that they 
appear on their face to be in accordance with the terms and conditions of the credit, 
and, if they do so appear, to pay…93 
 
It ǁas ĐoƌƌeĐt to ĐhaƌaĐteƌise the ďaŶk’s dutǇ uŶdeƌ the UCP to eǆaŵiŶe the doĐuŵeŶts ǁith 
reasonable care as a contractual obligation.94 This examination is confined to the documents 
theŵselǀes as is eǀideŶt iŶ the phƌase ͚oŶ theiƌ faĐe’.95 However, Lord Diplock then further 
characterised the ďaŶk’s ĐoŶtƌaĐtual oďligatioŶ to pay as triggered by documents which 
                                                     
91 Goode (n9) 231. 
92 Todd, Bills of Lading (n39), [9.148].  
93 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7 per Lord Diplock. 
94 UCP (1974 Version) Art.7. 
95 Ulph (n40) 362. 
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appeared to conform. This was incorrect; the UCP characterised payment on the basis of 
apparent compliance as an entitlement, as distinct from a contractual duty.96 To justify this, 
Lord Diplock cited Gian Singh v Banque de l’Indochine, a case in which the credit required a 
quality certificate to ďe sigŶed ďǇ a ͚BalǁaŶt SiŶgh, holder of Malaysian passport no. 
E.ϭϯϮϳϲ.’97 It later transpired that the document was an ingenious forgery although the paying 
bank had not been negligent in failing to detect this. The bank, faithful to its duty under the 
UCP, had Đaƌƌied out a ͚ǀisual iŶspeĐtioŶ of the aĐtual doĐuŵeŶts’ aŶd ǁas Ŷot ƌeƋuiƌed ͚to 
investigate the genuineness of a signature which, on the face of it, purports to be the 
signature of the person named or described in the letteƌ of Đƌedit.’98 Accordingly, Gian Singh 
is authority for the proposition that the paying bank is entitled to reimbursement if, despite 
a reasonable examination,99 defects in the documents were subsequently discovered.100 This 
is entirely appropriate where defects come to light after the beneficiary has received 
payment. The judgment in United City Merchants, however, recommends the same approach 
to presentations which are known to contain a forgery at the time of presentation. This is 
apparent in Lord Diplock’s lateƌ ĐoŵŵeŶts: 
 
It would be strange from the commercial point of view, although not theoretically 
impossible in law, if the contractual duty owed by confirming and issuing banks to the 
buyer to honour the credit on presentation of apparently conforming documents 
despite the fact that they contain inaccuracies or even are forged, were not matched 
                                                     
96 UCP Arts. 3a, 9 (1974). 
97 Gian Singh v Banque de l'Indochine [1974] 1 WLR 1234. 
98 Ibid 11 per Lord Diplock 
99 It was common ground that, iƌƌespeĐtiǀe of the ďeŶefiĐiaƌǇ’s kŶoǁledge, the paying bank would be liable in 
negligence if it paid against documents which it knew, or ought to have known, were fraudulent.  
100 Gian Singh (n98) 11 per Lord Diplock. 
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by a corresponding contractual liability of the confirming bank to the 
seller/beneficiary (in the absence, of course, of any fraud on his part) to pay the sum 
stipulated in the credit upon presentation of apparently conforming documents…101 
 
This goes too far. To characterise the bank as legally liable to the beneficiary for non-
compliant presentations wholly overlooks the significance of conformity in a sale by 
documents. The suggestion that the contracts created by the credit should be identical – 
͚ŵatĐhed ďǇ a ĐoƌƌespoŶdiŶg ĐoŶtƌaĐtual liaďilitǇ’ – also undermines the doctrine of 
autonomy. As noted earlier, autonomy demands that each contract is enforced on its own 
terms and treated as distinct from the other contracts within the network. This is not the 
same as requiring each contract to mirror the others in the network, as appears to be the 
thƌust of Loƌd DiploĐk’s aƌguŵeŶt here. The determination that forgery could not ground 
rejeĐtioŶ of the doĐuŵeŶts ǁas also ƌeliaŶt oŶ Loƌd DiploĐk’s ƌeadiŶg of the UCC. He argued:  
 
I would not wish to be taken as accepting that the premiss as to forged documents is 
correct, even where the fact that the document is forged deprives it of all legal effect 
and makes it a nullity, and so worthless to the confirming bank as security for its 
advances to the buyer. This is certainly not so under the Uniform Commercial Code as 
against a person who has taken a draft drawn under the credit in circumstances that 
would make him a holder in due course, and I see no reason why, and there is nothing 
in the Uniform Commercial Code to suggest that, a seller/beneficiary who is ignorant 
                                                     
101 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7 per Lord Diplock. 
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of the forgery should be in any worse position because he has not negotiated the draft 
before presentation.102 
 
We know from the earlier discussion, however, that this was incorrect; the UCC does and did 
not equate the holder in due course with the innocent beneficiary. The former is entitled to 
payment when they are unaware of the forgery,103 the latter is not. His Lordship declined to 
reach a conclusion on the nullity point since the issue did not arise directly.104 This would 
subsequently come before the Court of Appeal in Montrod v Grundkotter.105 
 
Respectfully, therefore, Lord Diplock was incorrect to characterise the bank as obliged to pay 
against documents proven to contain defects at presentation. This was apparent at the time; 
a different analysis more faithful to the UCP had been adopted by the Court of Appeal106 and 
also prompted contemporaneous criticism from Roy Goode.107 The Court of Appeal focussed 
on documentary compliance and concluded, critically, that a forged document was to be 
regarded as non-complying even if the beneficiary was unaware of it:  
 
If the signature on the bill of lading had been forged, a fact of which the sellers were 
ex hypothesi ignorant, but of which the bank was aware when the document was 
presented, I can see no valid basis upon which the bank would be entitled to take up 
the drafts and debit their customer… A banker cannot be compelled to honour a credit 
                                                     
102 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 9 per Lord Diplock. 
103 UCC §5-114(1) (1962). 
104 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 9 per Lord Diplock. 
105 Montrod (n7). 
106 United City Merchants (CA) (n60). 
107 Goode (n9). 
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unless all the conditions precedent have been performed, and he ought not to be 
under an obligation to accept or pay against documents which he knows to be waste 
paper. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the banker of that security for his 
advances, which is a cardinal feature of the process of financing carried out by means 
of the credit108 
 
As such, documentary compliance was considered wholly distinct from the wrongdoing of the 
beneficiary, the latter being dealt with under the fraud exception. This distinction, 
significantly, did not mean that the policy arguments employed by Lord Diplock had been 
ignored by the Court of Appeal: 
 
…the fewer the cases in which a bank is entitled to hold up payment the better for the 
smooth running of international trade. But I do not think that the Courts have a duty 
to assist international trade to run smoothly if it is fraudulent … Banks trust 
beneficiaries to present honest documents; if beneficiaries go to others (as they have 
to) for the documents they present, it is important to all concerned that those 
documents should accord,109 
 
The differences in approach adopted by the appellate courts are fascinating. Significantly, it 
cannot be explained by differences in counsel nor the arguments employed before the 
respective courts.110 Perhaps the only basis for explaining this difference is that it is an 
                                                     
108 United City Merchants (CA) (n60) 628 per Ackner LJ. 
109 Ibid 620 per Stephenson LJ. 
110 Compare: United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada [1983] AC 168, 173-178; United City Merchants v 
Royal Bank of Canada [1982] QB 208, 213-215. 
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͚uncharacteristic error of the late Lord Diplock.’111 This analysis is all the more compelling in 
light of his Loƌdship’s earlier comments in Gian Singh in which he appears to argue that known 
forgery would justify rejection by the bank: 
 
But if it did not conform, the customer does not need to rely on any negligence by the 
issuing or notifying bank in failing to detect the forgery, for independently of 
negligence, the issuing bank would be in breach of its contract with the customer if it 
paid the beneficiary on presentation of that document.112  
 
This, it is submitted, represents Lord Diplock analysing forgery as a matter of documentary 
compliance in which the knowledge of the beneficiary is irrelevant. This is wholly opposed to 
the position he adopted in United City Merchants and adds weight to the suggestion that his 
subsequent analysis was mistaken. 
 
Goode’s ĐƌitiƋue, ǁhiĐh eŵeƌged shortly after United City Merchants, mirrored the logic of 
the Court of Appeal judgment. His main contention was that the House of Lords had 
overlooked two distinct aspects of the enquiry when documents are presented under a credit: 
pre-conditions that the beneficiary must satisfy to become entitled to payment and defences 
to payment.113 IŶ Goode’s aŶalǇsis, these opeƌated seƋueŶtiallǇ ǁith the iŶitial foĐus oŶ 
whether the beneficiary had done everything required by the contract to become entitled to 
payment, namely to present the documents stipulated by the credit.114 Significantly, this 
                                                     
111 Goode (n9) 230. 
112 Gian Singh (n98) 12 per Lord Diplock. 
113 Goode (n9) 228, 232. 
114 E McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (4th ed. Penguin, 2010), 1106. 
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obligation does not depend on the documents merely appearing to conform. Therefore, if 
there are known defects at the time of presentation, the bank would be entitled to reject the 
presentation irrespective of who was responsible for the defects and of whether the 
beneficiary was aware of it. Non-conforming documents cannot be rendered conforming 
siŵplǇ ďǇ ǀiƌtue of the ďeŶefiĐiaƌǇ’s igŶoƌaŶĐe of those defeĐts.115 This was the very myth that 
Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgŵeŶt appeaƌed to ďe premised on. Importantly, this does not change the 
ďaŶk’s dutǇ of eǆaŵiŶatioŶ; the ďaŶk ƌeŵaiŶs eŶtitled to paǇ iŶ ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes ǁheƌe the 
documents appear to conform but should not be so entitled where defects have been 
established at the time of presentation. If the bank opts to reject, the beneficiary may 
retender within the timeframe permitted under the credit.116 Once the documents are 
deemed to comply, the autonomous nature of the credit means that it should be virtually 
impossible to disrupt payment to the beneficiary.117 Indeed, the only justification for non-
payment would be where the beneficiary had engaged in wrongdoing or was aware of 
material misrepresentations in the documents and evidence of this was demonstrated within 
the short timeframe permitted for document examination. 
 
Legal aŶalǇsis aside, Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgŵeŶt has had sigŶifiĐaŶt pƌaĐtiĐal ĐoŶseƋueŶĐes foƌ 
the efficiency of the credit mechanism, ironically the very thing that he sought to safeguard. 
The orthodox account of the credit mechanism values the doctrines of autonomy and strict 
compliance equally; both are considered vital for the success of the mechanism. However, in 
United City Merchants, the repeated (and incorrect) references to apparent compliance as 
the contractual basis for payment undermined the significance of strict compliance. This 
                                                     
115 Ibid 1106. 
116 Baatz (n30) 121. 
117 Goode (n9) 233; M Brindle and R Cox, Law of Bank Payments (3rd ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) [8.087]. 
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overrode the agreed risk allocation in respect of defects known at the time of presentation. 
Characterised correctly, the risk of such defects falls on the credit beneficiary since the 
presentation would not be complying and thus susceptible to rejection by the bank. Not only 
is this the allocation agreed by the parties in the credit by virtue of the doctrine of strict 
compliance, it is also the allocation traditionally recognised as the most efficient since the 
beneficiary is best placed to choose, and then exert control over, the person issuing the 
requisite documents.118 IŶ pƌaĐtiĐe, Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgŵeŶt ŵeaŶs that ďaŶks aƌe oďligated 
to accept documents known to be defective as good currency.119 This is despite the fact that 
such documents have been colourfully described as ͚the cancer of international trade.’120 At 
best, for example where the documents are forged and remain capable of serving their 
iŶteŶded puƌpose, this is likelǇ to ƌeduĐe paƌties’ ĐoŶfideŶĐe iŶ a ŵeĐhaŶism dependent on 
the veracity of documents. The position is more concerning where the documents are null 
given the consequences for the ultimate buyer and the issuing bank in the event of the credit 
appliĐaŶt’s iŶsolǀeŶĐǇ. It is also interesting to reflect oŶ Loƌd DiploĐk’s aŶalǇsis iŶ light of the 
ICC’s International Maritime Bureau, a wing of the Commercial Crime Service, to which banks 
can refer documents for authentication within the period permitted for examination.121 If 
Loƌd DiploĐk’s aĐĐouŶt of the ďaŶk’s oďligatioŶ ǁas ĐoƌƌeĐt, the ƌefeƌƌal seƌǀiĐe Đƌeates the 
distinct possibility that the bank would definitively know a document was incorrect yet 
nevertheless be compelled to pay.122 While this is surely bizarre, it is impossible to direct too 
                                                     
118 A Schwartz and R Scott, Commercial Transactions Principles and Policies (The Foundation Press, 1982) 21, 
ϵϭϴ; A KƌoŶŵaŶ, ͚Mistake, disclosure, informatioŶ, aŶd the laǁ of ĐoŶtƌaĐts’ ;ϭϵϳϴͿ 7 J Leg. Stud. 1, 4. 
119 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 7 per Lord Diplock. 
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much criticism at Lord Diplock here; the Service was established in 1981 and may have not 
permeated judicial mindsets so soon after its creation. There is, after all, no reference to the 
Service in arguments made by counsel for the bank. However, the modern significance of the 
Service casts further doubt on United City Merchants since its role in relation to documentary 
credits would be considerably reduced if payment obligations were as Lord Diplock suggested. 
In advocating a new approach to defective documents, the practical shortcomings of the 
current fraud exception cannot be ignored, particularly given the policy considerations 
uŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgŵeŶt. 
 
Despite poǁeƌful aĐadeŵiĐ disseŶts, Loƌd DiploĐk’s aŶalǇsis has ƌeŵaiŶed peƌsuasiǀe iŶ 
subsequent judicial considerations of documentary credits. This makes it all the more 
important that the proper treatment of defective documents is reconsidered in light of recent 
developments. Happily, this conflation is much harder to justify following the most recent 
version of the UCP and comparative case law on nullities. The most significant of these – the 
UCP 600 – was introduced in 2007 to overcome inter alia the high rate of discrepant 
presentations, estimated to affect 70% of presentations.123  
 
The UCP 600 deletes all ďut oŶe ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚oŶ theiƌ faĐe’. It is Ŷoǁ eǆpliĐit that the paǇiŶg 
ďaŶk’s ĐoŶtƌaĐtual oďligatioŶ is oŶlǇ eŶgaged ǁheŶ ͚ a pƌeseŶtatioŶ is ĐoŵplǇiŶg,’124 as distinct 
from a presentation which appears to comply. In cases where the presentation is not 
ĐoŵplǇiŶg, ďaŶks ͚ŵaǇ ƌefuse to hoŶouƌ oƌ Ŷegotiate’ the Đƌedit.125 The notion of apparent 
ĐoŵpliaŶĐe Ŷoǁ oŶlǇ appeaƌs iŶ estaďlishiŶg the ďaŶks’ dutǇ ǁheŶ doĐuŵeŶts aƌe pƌeseŶted; 
                                                     
123 UCP 600, foreword. 
124 UCP 600 Art 7a, Art 8a, Art 15a. 
125 UCP 600 Art 16a. 
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ŶaŵelǇ to assess ǁhetheƌ the doĐuŵeŶts ͚appeaƌ oŶ theiƌ faĐe to ĐoŶstitute a complying 
pƌeseŶtatioŶ.’126 This reinforces the fact that banks must not look beyond the documents nor 
investigate their genuineness but simply conduct a visual examination of the documents.127 
This preserves the earlier position, established in Gian Singh, that banks which have examined 
documents without negligence will be entitled to reimbursement notwithstanding the 
subsequent discovery of defects.128  
 
Two matters pertaining to the standard of documents tendered under the credit have also 
been modified uŶdeƌ the UCP ϲϬϬ. FiƌstlǇ, ͚ĐoŵplǇiŶg pƌeseŶtatioŶ’ has been clarified as one 
iŶ aĐĐoƌdaŶĐe ǁith ͚the teƌŵs aŶd ĐoŶditioŶs of the Đƌedit, the appliĐaďle pƌoǀisioŶs of these 
ƌules aŶd iŶteƌŶatioŶal staŶdaƌd ďaŶkiŶg pƌaĐtiĐe ;ISBPͿ.’129 By way of illustration, the ISBP 
does not recognise documents with typographical or grammatical errors as non-compliant 
where these issues do not affect the meaning of the documents.130 Accordingly, this should 
ensure that immaterial discrepancies are not capable of disrupting payment. Secondly, the 
UCP 600, prima facie paradoxically, also establishes a more flexible approach to compliance 
by permitting certain tolerances between the documents and the goods. To be explicit, article 
30 permits a tolerance of +/-10% in cases where the amount of the credit quantity of goods 
oƌ uŶit pƌiĐe aƌe Ƌualified ǁith ͚aďout’ oƌ ͚appƌoǆiŵatelǇ’131 and a tolerance of +/-5% of the 
quantity of goods is permitted in other cases, unless a stipulated number of items is explicit 
in the credit.132 Significantly, this is a pragmatic response to the need to reduce the high 
                                                     
126 UCP 600 Art 14a 
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131 UCP 600 Art 30a 
132 UCP 600 Art 30b 
 32 
number of discrepant presentations but it does not permit any degree of flexibility in relation 
to the quality of the tendered documents. 
 
Null documents require further consideration. Lord Diplock left the matter open133 and the 
issue subsequently came before the Court of Appeal in Montrod.134 In that case, Potter LJ cited 
eǆteŶsiǀelǇ fƌoŵ Loƌd DiploĐk’s judgŵeŶt aŶd, afteƌ disĐussiŶg the fƌaud eǆĐeptioŶ at leŶgth, 
continued:  
 
It [the fraud exception] should not be avoided or extended by the argument that a 
document presented, which conforms on its face with the terms of the letter of the 
credit, is none the less of a character which disentitles the person making the demand 
to payment because it is fraudulent in itself , independently of the knowledge and 
bona fides of the demanding party. In my view, that is the clear import of Lord 
Diplock's observations in the Gian Singh case … and in the United City Merchants 
case135 
 
This repeats the mistake of United City Merchants; null documents are tied to the fraud 
exception and beneficiary misconduct and not considered as a matter affecting compliance. 
Furthermore, the policy arguments used to justify this position were, with respect, specious. 
Potteƌ LJ suggested that a ŶullitǇ eǆĐeptioŶ ǁould ƌesult iŶ ͚uŶdesiƌaďle iŶƌoads iŶto the 
pƌiŶĐiples of autoŶoŵǇ aŶd ŶegotiaďilitǇ.’136 This supposes that nullities should be treated 
                                                     
133 United City Merchants (HL) (n1) 9 per Lord Diplock. 
134 Montrod (n7). 
135 Ibid [56] per Potter LJ. 
136 Ibid [58] per Potter LJ. 
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similarly to fraud by the beneficiary; as a defence to payment by the bank. This is misleading 
since nullities are an aspect of documentary compliance affecting only the instant contract 
under consideration.137 Viewed in this way, recognising nullity as a basis for rejection – and 
not a defence – should not engage any concerns about the autonomy nor negotiability of the 
credit. His Lordship was also of the view that courts would struggle to comprehensively define 
nullity which would thus render the law uncertain.138 Having said this, however, Potter LJ then 
proceeded to suggest that ͚uŶsĐƌupulous’139 conduct – arguably a much woollier term than 
nullity – ŵight justifǇ ďaŶks’ ƌejeĐtioŶ of pƌeseŶtatioŶs iŶ futuƌe. This has yet to attract further 
ĐoŵŵeŶt iŶ the Đase laǁ. Oǀeƌall, hoǁeǀeƌ, Potteƌ LJ’s judgŵeŶt is uŶhelpful; it ĐoŶtinues in 
the same vein as United City Merchants and extends that analysis to nullities. 
 
NotǁithstaŶdiŶg Potteƌ LJ’s poliĐǇ aƌguŵeŶts, the aďaŶdoŶŵeŶt of ƌefeƌeŶĐes to ͚oŶ theiƌ 
faĐe’ in the UCP 600, much like the discussion above, means that the decision in Montrod is 
now difficult to reconcile with the UCP. Moreover, appellate litigation in Singapore has taken 
a different approach to nullity and provides another perspective from which to consider 
English law. In Beam Technology,140 the credit required inter alia an air waybill and the buyer 
had notified the seller that this would be issued by freight forwarders, Link Express. It later 
transpired that the named entity did not exist meaning that a document purporting to be 
issued by this company could only be a nullity. The Singaporean Court of Appeal, correctly it 
is argued here, treated nullity as an aspect of compliance: 
 
                                                     
137 Horowitz (n6) [3.21]. 
138 Montrod (n7) [58] per Potter LJ. 
139 Ibid [59] per Potter LJ. 
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While the underlying principle is that the negotiating/confirming bank need not 
investigate the documents tendered, it is altogether a different proposition to say that 
the bank should ignore what is clearly a null and void document and proceed 
nevertheless to pay. Implicit in the requirement of a conforming document is the 
assumption that the document is true and genuine although under the UCP 500 and 
common law, and in the interest of international trade, the bank is not required to 
look beyond what appears on the surface of the documents. But to say that a bank, in 
the face of a forged null and void document (even though the beneficiary is not privy 
to that forgery), must still pay on the credit, defies reason and good sense.141 
 
This, without doubt, departs from the position adopted by the House of Lords in United City 
Merchants. Furthermore, the Singaporean court suggested that the definitional issues 
identified by Potter LJ142 could be overcome: 
 
…theƌe Đould ďe diffiĐulties iŶ deteƌŵiŶiŶg uŶdeƌ ǁhat ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes a doĐuŵeŶt 
would be considered material or a nullity, such a question can only be answered on 
the facts of each case. One cannot generalise. It is not possible to define when is a 
document a nullity. But it is really not that much more difficult to answer such 
questions than to determine what is reasonable, an exercise which the courts are all 
too familiar with.143 
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Consideration of the IMB document authentication service leads to the same conclusion on 
the definitional point since it stands to reason that a workable definition of nullity must have 
been developed in order to identify documents as ͚fake oƌ false.’144 IŶ ‘eŶ’s ĐƌitiƋue of the 
nullity concept, however, he described the current absence of a definition as rendering the 
nullity concept ͚uŶǁoƌkaďle’145 and suggested that reasonableness was not, therefore, a 
suitable comparator. A future English court, perhaps emboldened both by the Singaporean 
experience in Beam Technology and the existence of the IMB, would seem capable of defining 
nullity in a more concrete manner. This would seem to satisfactorily answer this aspect of 
‘eŶ’s ĐƌitiƋue. Accordingly, the article concludes by determining how the foregoing analysis 
should affect the legal response to fraud and defects known at presentation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This article has argued that recent judicial and legislative developments require 
ƌeĐoŶsideƌatioŶ of the keǇ deďates tƌiggeƌed ďǇ Loƌd DiploĐk’s aŶalǇsis iŶ United City 
Merchants. Accordingly, consideration now turns to how a modern court should approach 
the fraud exception and documents known to contain defects on presentation. 
 
To begin with the shape of the fraud exception, it will be recalled that Lord Diplock 
constructed the fraud exception narrowly so that courts could only intervene in the most 
eǆĐeptioŶal of ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes. To do otheƌǁise, he aƌgued, ǁould ͚uŶdeƌŵiŶe the ǁhole 
systeŵ’146 on which financing by documentary credits was based. However, consideration of 
                                                     
144 ICC, ͚Tƌade FiŶaŶĐe’ ;ŶϭϮϮͿ. 
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the American approach to fraud reveals that this policy consideration does not withstand 
scrutiny. This is because the broader approach to fraud enshrined in the UCC has not resulted 
in the commercial disruption feared by Lord Diplock and subsequent English courts. 
CoŶǀeƌselǇ, iŶ faĐt, BaƌŶes aŶd BǇƌŶe haǀe ǁelĐoŵed the ͚speĐifiĐitǇ ǁith ǁhiĐh the LC fƌaud 
exception is addressed in section 5-ϭϬϵ’147 and attribute this to a reduction in litigation. In this 
way, the 1995 revisions achieve their aim, namely to reduce the likelihood of judicial 
intervention in credit transactions.148 
 
The development of the respective fraud rules also merits brief comment. The English rule, 
as we know, is wholly a product of the common law. By contrast, the American exception 
codified the decision in Sztejn149 and was subsequently amended in 1995. This legislative 
pƌoĐess faĐilitated the ͚balance [of] competing interests or perspectives in a manner which 
fairly reflects the reasonable commercial eǆpeĐtatioŶs of the paƌties’150 and, importantly, 
involved both banks and traders in the drafting process. This is an enviable position151 which 
the English judiciary cannot replicate within the confines of a single case. This lends further 
weight to the argument that the policy arguments said to justify the English exception are not 
fixed and demand reassessment in a suitable case. 
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This is not to say, of course, that England should simply import the American fraud exception. 
A continued preference for a narrow exception would be entirely acceptable; indeed, this 
ŵuĐh is eǆpliĐit iŶ the ICC’s ĐoŶtiŶued ƌefusal to legislate foƌ fƌaud iŶ the UCP. If a futuƌe 
English court wishes to retain a narrow fraud exception, however, the American experience 
tells us that more compelling policy arguments will be required to justify this approach. The 
suggestion made here is that a modern court needs not only to strengthen the policy analysis 
of the fraud exception but also to view beneficiary wrongdoing holistically. To regard 
beneficiary wrongdoing as the trigger for the fraud exception is wholly correct since, on the 
analysis adopted here, all known defects will be dealt with as a matter of compliance. 
However, wrongdoing should be defined broadly so as to include fraud by the beneficiary in 
the underlying transaction. To do otherwise emasculates the notion of ex turpi causa and 
prevents the court from carrying out this important policy role. The current myopic focus on 
the documents is illogical and it would clearly be preferable if any fraud by the beneficiary in 
connection with the credit could oust the doctrine of autonomy. Indeed, in the context of 
preventing payment under a performance guarantee, the Court of Appeal have appeared 
receptive to the notion that fraudulent misrepresentation inducing the underlying contract 
justified judicial intervention.152 It is hoped that this decision would be persuasive to the 
Supreme Court should a similar issue arise involving a documentary credit. 
 
The second issue triggered by United City Merchants was the fate of documents known to 
ĐoŶtaiŶ defeĐts at the tiŵe of pƌeseŶtatioŶ. As a ƌeŵiŶdeƌ, Loƌd DiploĐk’s aŶalǇsis oďliged 
banks to pay notwithstanding that the presentation contained a forgery.153 This analysis was 
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subsequently extended to null documents in Montrod.154 The underlying premise of this 
analysis – that beneficiary knowledge was required before the bank could reject the 
presentation – was flawed. In this regard, the UCP 600 fundamentally changes matters and 
makes it much easier to recognise known defects as an objective issue affecting documentary 
compliance. Indeed, the aďaŶdoŶŵeŶt of all ďut oŶe ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͚oŶ theiƌ faĐe’ ĐoŶfiƌŵs that 
the beneficiary is only guaranteed payment in return for a ͚ĐoŵplǇiŶg pƌeseŶtatioŶ.’155 The 
ŶotioŶ of appaƌeŶt ĐoŵpliaŶĐe is Ŷoǁ solelǇ tied to the ďaŶk’s eŶtitleŵeŶt to ƌeiŵďuƌseŵeŶt 
in circumstances where, despite a visual examination of the documents, they could not have 
uncovered the defect.156 Accordingly, the current UCP provides clear doctrinal support for a 
distinction between strict compliance and defences to payment.  
 
So how then should a modern court respond to known nullities and forgeries? The weight of 
academic comment favours a right to reject nullities.157 Clearly, there is no way that a null 
document can be described as complying if the defect is known at the time of presentation 
and so to require payment in these circumstances would be preposterous. To entitle 
rejection, conversely, is clearly correct when the broader significance of nullities for the 
ultimate purchaser and the issuing bank is considered. This approach, moreover, would 
reflect the rationale in Sanders v Maclean which prioritised protection against insolvency in 
commercial transactions. Indeed, to do otherwise may well result in banks becoming less 
willing to finance documentary credit transactions.  
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Recent appellate litigation on nullities lends further support to the notion that null documents 
should justify rejection by the bank. In particular, the discussion in Beam Technology correctly 
distinguishes compliance from beneficiary wrongdoing and this analysis, in contrast to that in 
Montrod, is more compatible with the UCP 600. Critically, Beam Technology also provides a 
route by which to circumvent supposed definitional issues surrounding nullity which could be 
employed to distinguish Montrod in a suitable case.  
 
However, academic commentators have failed to reach unanimity in respect of forged 
documents. At its broadest, the notion of non-conformity would entitle the bank to reject 
documents containing any known forgery, fraudulent misstatement or nullity at the time of 
presentation. There is considerable support for this standard of non-conformity,158 including 
Goode himself: 
 
The short point is that the UCP and the terms of every credit require the presentation 
of specified documents, that is, documents which are what they purport to be, and 
there is no warrant for the conclusion that this entitles the beneficiary to present, for 
example, any old piece of paper which purports to be a bill of lading … even if it is 
forged, unauthorised, or otherwise fraudulent.159 
 
However, other commentators – including Goode elsewhere in his work160 – have favoured a 
narrower approach which only recognises nullities as non-complying.161 Goode’s ƌatioŶale ǁas 
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that document in question remained capable of serving its intended commercial purpose; 
͚the insertion of a false shipping date in the bill of lading did not prevent it from being what 
it purported to be.’162 Respectfully, this is Goode having his cake and eating it too; it is 
impossible to champion the sequential analysis and simultaneously affirm the outcome in 
United City Merchants. Put simply, a falsely dated bill of lading is not a complying document 
and should thus justify rejection.  Accordingly, the broad view of non-conformity is preferred 
here.  
 
Of course, a broader conception of non-conformity carries the risk that more presentations 
would be rejected. This is significant given that the impetus for reform of the UCP was to 
reduce the high rate of discrepant presentations. This, it is submitted, would not cause 
problems in practice since the doctrine of waiver in the UCP enables the issuing bank to 
approach the applicant where the documents do not appear to constitute a complying 
presentation to authorise payment.163 This should mean that defective presentations would 
only be rejected when payment had not been authorised by the applicant. We already know 
that waiver is used extensively in practice. In Ronald Mann’s eŵpiƌiĐal studǇ fƌoŵ the late 
1990s, more than 70% of presentations in 500 credit transactions were discrepant164 and 
these discrepancies ranged from minor, immaterial matters to substantive non-performance 
by the beneficiary.165 Notwithstanding these discrepancies, full payment was made via waiver 
in all but one case, in which a payment of 94% of the contract price was made.166 If applicants 
are typically prepared to waive documentary issues when they know substantive 
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performance is forthcoming,167 this should overcome concern about the disruptive effect of 
recognising forged documents as non-compliant. Indeed, the speed with which waiver was 
obtained in this study – typically within one banking day168 – coupled with the fact that waiver 
does not extend the time for document examination,169 should allay fears that credit 
transactions will become less secure if forged and null documents are to justify rejection. The 
deǀelopŵeŶt of ŵodeƌŶ ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs siŶĐe MaŶŶ’s studǇ should faĐilitate ďoth the speed 
of the waiver process and interactions between the contracting parties.170 As a result, the 
prevalence of waiver in practice suggests that banks would only need to exercise an 
entitlement to reject rarely as a means of safeguarding their position. Critically, nothing in 
this analysis would prevent the beneficiary from retendering documents before the expiry of 
the credit. 
 
The standard of proof, discussed earlier, is also relevant to the treatment of forged and null 
documents. The same time constraints which affect the invocation of the fraud exception 
would apply here; evidence of the defect would need to be established within five banking 
days to reject the documents as non-complying. This issue may well be less problematic in 
this context. Firstly, evidence would be limited to the existence of the forgery or nullity itself; 
the applicant or issuing bank would not be required to attribute the defect to the beneficiary. 
This clearly reduces the evidential burden. In addition, the availability of the International 
Maritime Bureau’s doĐuŵeŶt autheŶtiĐatioŶ seƌǀiĐe, coupled with improvements in 
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technology and communication, must surely allay the fear that a new approach to forged or 
null documents would be stymied by evidential concerns.    
 
Much has changed in the legal world in the last four decades. In the context of documentary 
credits, the introduction of the UCP 600, the revised Uniform Commercial Code and case law 
on nullities have been significant developments. However, the fraud exception remains 
unchanged; constrained within the same narrow parameters that Lord Diplock established in 
United City Merchants. Clearly the policy argument which dictated this decision – to preserve 
the efficiency of the credit mechanism – was compelling, but the flaǁs iŶ Loƌd DiploĐk’s 
analysis are clearly illuminated by these recent developments. It is hoped, therefore, that in 
a suitable case, a modern Supreme Court will confine United City Merchants to history so that 
the next forty years are not premised on an outdated and flawed approach to fraud and 
documentary compliance. 
 
